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Abstract Weconsiderenvironmentalregulationinacontextwhereﬁrmsinvestinabatement
technology under conditions of uncertainty about subsequent abatement cost, but can subse-
quently adjust output in the light of true marginal abatement cost. Where an emissions tax is
theonlyavailableinstrument,policyfacesatrade-offbetweentheincentivetoinvestinabate-
ment technology and efﬁciency in subsequent output decisions. More efﬁcient outcomes can
be achieved by supplementing the emissions tax with direct regulation of abatement technol-
ogy, or by combining the tax with an abatement technology investment subsidy. We compare
the properties of these alternative instrument combinations.
Keywords Externalities · Pigouvian taxes · Regulation · Subsidies
JEL Classiﬁcation H23
1 Introduction
It is well known that uncertainty about the costs of pollution abatement has implications for
the choice between alternative forms of pollution regulation. Weitzman’s celebrated analysis
(Weitzman 1974) sets out conditions under which regulation using a price-based instrument
such as an environmental tax on emissions would be more or less efﬁcient than regulation
by quantity, such as a system of tradeable emission quotas. Developing this line of analysis,
Roberts and Spence (1976) show that in fact a mixed instrument, combining elements of
price and quantity regulation, would out-perform either price or quantity regulation alone. In
particular, they demonstrate that the expected welfare costs of quantity regulation based on
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tradeable emission quotas will be reduced if supplemented by an element of price regulation,
intheformofupperandlowerboundstothepermittedrangeofpermitprices.Judgedagainst
the ex post optimum this mixed regulatory regime–with appropriately-chosen parameters-
performs better than either price or quantity regulation alone.
In this paper, we explore the implications of uncertainty for optimal environmental regu-
lation in a context which extends, and in some respects contrasts with the approach taken by
these earlier papers.
LikeRobertsandSpenceweareparticularlyinterestedincharacterisingcaseswherecom-
bined use of two regulatory instruments may be able to achieve outcomes which mitigate the
potentially-extreme ex post inefﬁciencies that arise from dependence on a single regulatory
approach. Unlike Roberts and Spence, however, we focus on cases where efﬁcient quantity
regulation, in the form of tradeable emissions quotas, is not an available option. This is a
case of considerable practical relevance, especially in contexts where the number of ﬁrms to
be regulated is too small to sustain a competitive market for tradable permits, or where the
transactions costs of emissions trading are too high. We therefore focus on an initial regu-
latory approach based on an emissions tax, supplemented by other instruments with certain
second-best limitations. Nevertheless it would be reasonable to anticipate that there would
be some symmetry between our analysis and that of Roberts and Spence, and we explore the
extent to which this is the case.
A second respect in which our analysis develops this earlier literature is that we provide a
clearer characterisation of the uncertainties and informational asymmetries, and the way in
which these constrain the operation of environmental regulation. Like this earlier literature
we consider cases where uncertainty differentially affects governments and ﬁrms, and unlike
policy-makers, the ﬁrms in our model are able to make certain decisions in the light of the
true realised state. However, our model involves a richer set of decisions, which provide a
clearer context for this asymmetry. In particular, both governments and ﬁrms are forced to
make decisions about one form of abatement, based on long-term investment, before the
uncertaintyisresolved.Firmssubsequentlymakeaseconddecisionaffectingtheiremissions
when they decide on their level of output, and this decision is made after the uncertainty has
been resolved. We argue later that this context provides a clearer motivation for the presence
of uncertainty, and its differential impact on policy and business decision-makers than the
rather ad hoc uncertainty in the earlier literature.
The model we consider is one in which a regulatory agency seeks to control pollution
from ﬁrms which produce a commodity that they sell at an exogenous price. The assumption
that the price is exogenous allows us to neglect general equilibrium effects, and to focus on
the issues of direct interest. We might for example think of this as a commodity which is
traded in a global market, but other interpretations are possible.
We represent uncertainty in our model as uncertainty about the output price.1 This is
unknown to the authorities at the time the regulatory parameters are set, and is unknown to
the ﬁrm at the time they make long-term irreversible investments in abatement technology,
butﬁrmsmaketheiroutputdecisionsbasedonthetruepricerealisation.Whentheworldprice
for the product is high, ﬁrms will wish to produce more, and their higher output generates
additional pollution. To the extent that pollution abatement can be partly achieved through
output reductions, a higher output price translates into a higher marginal cost of pollution
abatement.
1 A similar representation of abatement cost uncertainty appears in Quirion (2005), who compares separately
the merits of three possible policy instruments, a tax, an absolute emissions cap, and a relative emissions cap.
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Uncertainty about the costs of pollution abatement can take different forms. One version
involvesonce-and-for-allscenarioinwhichatsomefuturedateastateoftheworldwillunfold
andthenremainunchanged.Atthetimewhenpolicydecisionsaremade,itisuncertainwhich
state of the world will emerge. With this form of uncertainty it is perhaps difﬁcult to explain
why policy cannot subsequently be adjusted in the light of actual circumstances, but a case
for a once-and-for-all solution may still be made as argued by Roberts and Spence (1976,
p.193).2 Asecondtypeofuncertaintyarisesina“vibrating”system,inwhichthereisfrequent
variationinstatesovertime.3 Ifpolicycannotbeadjustedrapidlyenoughtochangingstates,it
willbenecessarytosetavailableinstrumentssoastomaximiseaveragesocialefﬁciencyover
timeoracrosscontingencies.Athirdinterpretationofuncertaintyinpolicy-makingisactually
an information asymmetry: the government lacks information about circumstances that are
crucialfortheeffectsofpolicydecisions—“inadequateinformation”oran“informationgap”
in the words of Weitzman (1974,p. 480.) In our model, we focus on forms of uncertainty that
involve a clear temporal sequence rather than information asymmetry, but the uncertainty
about the future could equally well be interpreted as a single uncertain event or a rapidly-
changing sequence of randomly generated states.
Related literature includes a number of studies of instrument choice, and studies of irre-
versible abatement investment under uncertainty.
In the ﬁrst category, Christiansen and Smith (2011) consider how second-best limitations
on available instruments give rise to a case for combined use of multiple instruments, even in
the absence of uncertainty. The instrument choice literature also includes discussion of the
properties of relative emissions quotas—in other words, quotas deﬁned relative to output -
which will tend to encourage abatement, while having a lower impact on output decisions
than absolute quotas. Ebert (1998) for example, considers a model of relative standards in a
contextwithnouncertaintyandidenticalﬁrms.Hecharacterisestheoptimalrelativestandard
whereitistheonlyinstrumentemployedandshowsthatitisneverequivalenttoanoptimally
chosen environmental tax.
The literature on irreversibility in abatement investment includes a number of papers
looking at the timing of abatement investments, assuming a stochastic time path for demand
or output price (see e.g. Xepapadeas 2001,a n dChao and Wilson 1993). In this context
investors have the option to delay irreversible investment, and will choose to do so in states
where prices are unfavourable. As a result, the market price for emissions allowances will
exceed the marginal cost of abatement investment by an amount which can be interpreted as
anoptionvalue.Inourmodel,theseissuesdonotarise,asweassumethatasingleinvestment
(commitment) decision is made, and that the ﬁrm has no choice about timing.
Baldursson and Fehr (2004) set up a model where proﬁts are uncertain due to uncertain
future number of ﬁrms and uncertain polluting emissions prior to abatement. They consider
a long-term irreversible investment under uncertainty and a short-term abatement decision
after the uncertainty is resolved, with both decisions affecting polluting emissions. This is
a distinction similar to ours. Most of the analysis is devoted to quota regimes, but they also
brieﬂy address a tax regime. By the assumptions of their model the marginal proﬁtability
of investment is deterministic, in contrast to the model we present in this paper. Due to this
assumption, Baldursson and Fehr’s model achieves cost efﬁciency in emission reductions
through the conventional result that all abatement activities are carried out up to the point
2 “…we are rejecting the idea that the government can ‘feel out’ the ‘optimum’ by successively announcing
and revising its policies…” “Given these circumstances, we have opted for the once-and –for –all-problem…”
Op. cit. p. 193.
3 This is a possibility alluded to by Weitzman (1974): He refers to “elements of genuine randomness”
(op. cit. p. 480) and adds: “like day-to-day ﬂuctuations” (op. cit. footnote 1).
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where the respective marginal abatement costs are equated to the tax. This property does
not hold in our model, and it is this which creates the case for combined use of multiple
instruments
Inthenextsectionwesetupthebasiceconomicmodel,andwecharacterisethebehaviour
of ﬁrms in Sect. 3. In Sect. 4 we consider policy when the regulator is conﬁned to using
an emissions tax as the sole instrument. Sections 5 and 6 then show how the availability of
an additional instrument, in the form respectively of regulation of abatement technology or
subsidytoabatementinvestment,canimprovetheregulatoryoutcome.Section7drawssome
conclusions.
2 The Economic Setting
In our model there are a ﬁxed number of ﬁrms which produce a homogeneous good, using
a production process which generates emissions. Emissions can be reduced through ini-
tial investment in an abatement technology, and also by varying the level of output. These
decisions are made at different times and with different amounts of information available:
• At an initial stage, ﬁrms must commit to the abatement technology they will use while
facing uncertainty about output price and the future output level to be chosen conditional
on that price. At this stage the ﬁrm incurs any up-front costs of investment in the chosen
abatement technology. In addition, adopting a more effective abatement technology at
this stage will increase the subsequent cost of producing each unit of output. (Later in the
paper, when we consider emissions taxes and other policy instruments, we will assume
that these too must be set at this stage, in the face of uncertainty about output prices.)
• At a subsequent stage, the output price is revealed, and ﬁrms make decisions about output
levels in full knowledge of the output price and given their technology commitment from
the initial stage. At this stage the ﬁrms incur the costs of production and of operating the
abatement technology that they selected at the initial stage.
The strategy of a ﬁrm at the initial stage will be to look ahead to the subsequent stage
and, for each possible abatement technology they could select at the ﬁrst stage, consider
how much to produce conditional on any price being revealed. The ﬁrst-stage commitment
to a particular abatement technology will affect the cost of producing each unit of output
in the second stage, and will also affect the reduction in emissions that is achieved, for any
given level of output. The ﬁrm will then base its initial abatement technology decision on the
expected proﬁts at the subsequent stage that will result from any initial decision.
Onepossiblepracticalinterpretationofourmodelisthatitrepresentsthetypeofdecisions
that have to be made about pollution abatement in the power sector. Typically, acid rain poli-
cies include some major investments in pollution abatement facilities at power stations, such
asﬂuegasdesulphurisation(FGD)“scrubbers”.Theseinvestmentsarelargeandirreversible,
and have to be made in the face of uncertainty about many relevant variables, including the
futureleveloftheelectricityprice.Theyalsosigniﬁcantlyaffectthecostsoffutureoperation,
and hence of future changes in output and emissions. For example, data provided by Islas et
al. (2005) on the initial capital costs and subsequent operating and maintenance costs for a
range of SO2 abatement technologies indicate that the capital costs and additional operating
costs for many such abatement technologies may be of broadly similar orders of magnitude.
Where the electricity price in future is low, a power station that has selected an abatement
technology involving high unit costs of operation might be able to reduce emissions more
cheaply (ie at less sacriﬁce in terms of proﬁt) by reducing its level of output than a power
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station that has chosen an equally-effective abatement technology where the costs are pri-
marilythoseoftheinitialinvestment.Forboth,however,theamountofabatementthatcanbe
achieved through output reduction will be lower than for a “dirty” power station which ini-
tially chose a relatively cheap technology offering little abatement. In other words, the initial
abatement technology decision, made before future prices are known, will have implications
for the costs of reducing emissions during future operation.
We formalise our model in terms of a representative ﬁrm that produces x units of a
good. The good is sold at an exogenous price p, which is assumed to be stochastic with
density f (p). Our assumption that the price is exogenous is made to avoid unnecessary
complexity; it might, for example, be understood to reﬂect the case of ﬁrms which are
price-takers in international trade. The (private) cost of production, neglecting abatement,
is C(x). γ parameterises the choice of abatement technology, which is made in the ﬁrst
stage and is assumed to be irreversible; it reﬂects the reduction in emissions per unit of
output. In the absence of any abatement activity γ = 0. Adopting an abatement technology,
each unit of emissions is is reduced to a fraction 1−γ of the no-abatement level. In general,
0 ≤ γ ≤ 1.ThecostofabatementisG(x,γ)+ K(γ)where K(γ)isaninitialcost,unrelated
to subsequent output, and G(x,γ)is an operating cost of the abatement technology, which
depends on the output level.
K(γ)istheﬁxed(ieoutput-independent)costofinstallingtheequipmentneededtoreduce
the emission level to 1−γ. It turns out that what really matters in the subsequent analysis is
whether K (γ) is zero or strictly positive. The former case may occur either because there is
no payment at all up front or because the up-front payment is the same for all γ.H o w e v e r ,i n
order to limit the number of cases to consider, in what follows we shall simply refer to cases
with and without a ﬁxed cost. Where K (γ) > 0, we assume that K  (γ) ≥ 0.
G(x,γ)is interpreted as the cost of applying the technology γ to x units of output. We
assume that ∂G(x,γ)/∂x>0,∂G(x,γ)/∂γ >0,∂2G(x,γ)/∂x2≥0,∂2G(x,γ)/∂γ 2 > 0
and ∂2G(x,γ)/∂x∂γ > 0. Using the abatement technology is more costly the larger is the
output to which it is applied and the higher is the abatement rate γ that it achieves.
In general, ﬁrms have different cost structures and may choose different output and abate-
ment levels, and may therefore have different levels of emissions. Aggregate emissions
across all ﬁrms are Z =
 
i (1 − γi)xi. The emissions give rise to an external cost which is
assumed to be an increasing and strictly convex function of aggregate emissions expressed
as D(Z) = D
  
i (1 − γi)xi
 
where D  > 0a n dD   > 0. The external cost is increasing
in output (xi) and decreasing in abatement effort (γi).
Given our assumptions, the social surplus arising from the activities of the ﬁrms is the
gross output value net of social (private and external) costs, which equals
ψ =
 
i
(pxi − Ci (xi)) − D
⎛
⎝
 
j
 
1 − γj
 
x j
⎞
⎠ −
 
i
Gi (γi,xi) −
 
i
Ki (γi) (1)
Emissions can be diminished either by increasing γ or reducing output, x.T h em a r g i n a l
cost of abatement by reducing x is p − C 
i − ∂Gi/∂xi which is stochastic due to the
randomness of p.
In the interest of tractability and ease of exposition, we shall consider special cases adopt-
ing simple functional forms in parts of the paper. We deﬁne one of these as follows:
Special case S1 Linear private and social marginal cost functions. We set C(x) = cx2/2
where c is a positive parameter, and G(x,γ)= k(γ)x,w h e r ek  > 0a n dk   > 0. The
former assumption is the widely-adopted simpliﬁcation that marginal production cost
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is linear in output. The latter assumption is that there is a ﬁxed cost of operating the
abatement equipment per unit of output to which it is applied. The unit cost will be larger
where a more advanced technology is operated.
The equivalent expression to (1) in the special case S1 is
  =
 
i
pxi −
 
i
1
2
cix2
i − D
 
 
i
(1 − γi)xi
 
−
 
i
ki(γi)xi −
 
i
Ki(γi) (2)
The marginal cost of abatement by reducing x in this case is p − cix − ki(γ).
3 Producer Behaviour
In this section we characterise the behaviour of producers, who are subject to a tax τ per
unit of emissions, set irrevocably by the government prior to the time at which producers
commit to their initial decisions about the abatement technology they will employ, γ. Recall
that when the ﬁrms must make their abatement technology decision they are uncertain about
the output price, but that their subsequent output decisions are made after the output price is
known.
The proﬁts of each producer i will be
 i = pxi − Ci(xi) − Gi(γi,xi) − Ki(γi) − τ(1 − γi)xi (3)
Afterthepriceuncertaintyhasbeenresolved,theﬁrmchoosesanoutputleveltomaximise
proﬁts conditional on the γi. This yields the ﬁrst order condition
∂ i
∂xi
= p − C 
i(xi) −
∂Gi
∂xi
− τ(1 − γi) = 0( 4 )
and the second order condition
∂2 i
∂x2
i
=− C  
i −
∂2Gi
∂x2
i
< 0
The ﬁrst order condition implicitly deﬁnes xi as a function of γi and τ : xi(p,τ,γ i).
Prior to the price uncertainty being resolved, expected proﬁts are
E ( i) =
 
(pxi − Ci(xi) − Gi(γi,xi) − Ki(γi) − τ(1 − γi)xi) f (p)dp (5)
where E denotes the expectations operator. Inserting xi(p,τ,γ i), yields E ( i) as a function
of γi and τ. The ﬁrm chooses γi, the abatement technology, to maximise expected proﬁts.
This yields the ﬁrst order condition
dE( i)
dγi
=− E
 
∂Gi
∂γi
 
+ τE (xi) − K 
i = 0( 6 )
where the Envelope Theorem has been invoked. The second order condition is
d2E ( i)
dγ 2
i
< 0
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Doing comparative statics to analyse the effect of a tax change, we ﬁrst differentiate (4)
with respect to τ to ﬁnd the effect of the tax for a given abatement technology. We get
∂xi
∂τ
= (1 − γi)
  
−C  
i −
∂2Gi
∂x2
i
 
(7)
and it follows that ∂xi
∂τ < 0. Differentiating (4)w r tγi we ﬁnd
∂xi
∂γi
=
 
∂2Gi
∂xi∂γi
− τ
   
−C  
i −
∂2Gi
∂x2
i
 
(8)
The effect will depend on the sign of ∂2Gi
∂xi∂γi − τ. There are two potentially conﬂicting
effects. When a better abatement technology is chosen an increase in output will generate
less additional pollution, and add less to the tax liability, which will stimulate production.
However, choosing a better abatement technology will make production more costly.
Differentiating (6) to explore the effect of the tax on the choice of abatement technology,
we ﬁnd
d2E (πi)
dγ 2
i
∂γi
∂τ
+ E (xi) + τ
∂E (xi)
∂τ
− E
 
∂2Gi
∂xi∂γi
∂xi
∂τ
 
= 0( 9 )
allowingforthefactthatxi isafunctionofτ.Wenotethatthereareconﬂictingeffects.Alarger
emission tax will increase the tax savings from further abatement and stimulate investment
in abatement technology. The effect is larger the larger is expected output. Secondly, a larger
tax will lower output and hence the amount of pollution affected by improved abatement
technology, making it less worthwhile to invest. Finally, a lower output will reduce the
operating cost of using a better abatement technology, inducing more investment.
NowconsiderthespecialcaseofthecostfunctionsS1introducedabove,whereG(γ,x) =
k(γ)x,
∂G(γ,x)/∂x = k(γ)
∂G(γ,x)/∂γ = k (γ)x
∂2G(γ,x)/∂x∂γ = k (γ)
Also setting C(x) = cx2/2, we now get, for ﬁrm i,
∂ i
∂xi
= p − cxi − τ(1 − γi) − ki(γi) = 0,
and it follows that
xi =
p − τ(1 − γi) − ki(γi)
ci
. (10)
E(xi) =
E(p) − τ(1 − γi) − ki(γi)
ci
(11)
∂xi
∂τ
=
∂E (xi)
∂τ
=
−(1 − γi)
ci
, (12)
and
∂xi
∂γi
=
∂E(xi)
∂γi
=
τ − k 
i(γi)
ci
(13)
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The ﬁrst order condition for the choice ofγi now becomes
 
τ − k 
i(γi)
 
E(xi)−K 
i(γi) =
0, so that
τ − k 
i(γi) = K 
i(γi)/E(xi) (14)
implying that ∂xi/∂γi ≥ 0. Firms will choose the same abatement technology if all cost
elements are the same in all ﬁrms, i.e. k 
i(γ), K 
i(γi) and ci do not vary across ﬁrms. We
also note that if K 
i = 0, and the cost of abatement is the same in every ﬁrm, ki(γ) = k(γ),
all ﬁrms will choose the same technology γ given by γ = k −1(τ). This will hold even if
production costs differ, in other words, if ﬁrms have different values for ci.
Inserting the special case S1 in (9), we get
d2E (πi)
dγ 2
i
dγi
dτ
−
 
τ − k 
i
  1 − γi
ci
+ E (xi) = 0 (15)
Asinthegeneralcase,wehavetheopposingeffectsondγi/dτ consideredabove.However,
in the case S1 where K 
i = 0, we get τ − k 
i(γi) = 0a n ddγi/dτ = 1/k  
i (γi)>0. In this
case it also follows that ∂xi/∂γi = 0. The output level is independent of the abatement
technology, because the tax saving and the cost effect cancel out.
In order to limit the number of possible cases to investigate, we will assume that a larger
tax will stimulate investment in abatement technology, dγi/dτ>0. This assumption applies
for the remainder of the paper, in both speciﬁc and general cases, as this seems the more
plausible case.
Finally, consider the total effect of τ on xi allowing for the fact that the tax will affect
output both directly and indirectly via the effect on investment in abatement technology:
dxi
dτ = ∂xi
∂τ + ∂xi
∂γi
∂γi
∂τ .
Due to the ambiguity of ∂xi/∂γi, the sign of dxi/dτ is also ambiguous. The immediate
impact of a higher tax is to reduce output, but investment in a better abatement technology
may stimulate output because of the lower emission tax liability.
We can now summarise the various behavioural responses.
In the general case we ﬁnd the following: For a given choice of abatement technology,
γ, a higher tax will diminish output: ∂x/∂τ < 0. Improving the abatement technology will
have ambiguous effects on the output level as it will lower the tax burden but increase the
cost of production. Where the choice of abatement technology is endogenous a higher tax
will have conﬂicting effects both on the choice of abatement technology and output.
For the special functional forms S1 in which private and social marginal cost functions
are linear we ﬁnd ∂x
∂τ and dx
dτ = ∂x
∂τ + ∂x
∂γ
∂γ
∂τ are independent of p. Where K  > 0w eﬁ n d
that ∂x
∂γ > 0. Where K  = 0w eﬁ n d∂x
∂τ = 0, dx
dτ = ∂x
∂τ + ∂x
∂γ
∂γ
∂τ = 0, ∂x
∂γ = 0a n d
∂γ
∂τ > 0.
Where the initial abatement technology decision involves a non-zero sunk investment cost,
a more effective abatement technology leads to increased output.
4 The Government Sets τ Only
In this and subsequent sections we consider various government policies. We start with the
case where the government sets an emissions tax but does not directly interfere with the
producer’s choice of abatement technology. Our assumption is that this tax must be set prior
to output price uncertainty being resolved, and that it then must remain ﬁxed. In setting
the emissions tax τ the government takes into account that this will affect the producer’s
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choice of output once the price becomes known, and also the producer’s choice of abatement
technology prior to knowing the price.
The government maximises the expected social surplus
E (ψ) =
 
⎛
⎝
 
i
(pxi − C (xi)) − D
⎛
⎝
 
j
 
1 − γj
 
x j
⎞
⎠ −
 
i
Gi (γi,xi)
−
 
i
Ki (γi)
 
f (p)dp
Differentiating with respect to τ,w eg e t
dE(ψ)
dτ
=
     
p − C 
i (xi) −
∂Gi
∂xi
 
− D   
(1 − γi)
  
∂xi
∂τ
+
∂xi
∂γi
∂γi
∂τ
 
f (p)dp
−
     
∂Gi
∂γi
+ K 
i − D xi
  
∂γi
∂τ
f (p)dp
which must be equated to zero at the optimum. Making use of (4)a n d( 6), we obtain
dE(ψ)
dτ
=
    
τ (1 − γi) − D   
(1 − γi)
  
∂xi
∂τ
+
∂xi
∂γi
∂γi
∂τ
 
f (p)dp
−
    
τE(xi) − D xi
  ∂γi
∂τ
f (p)dp (16)
dE(ψ)
dτ
= E
 
 
i
 
τ − D   ∂xi
∂τ
(1 − γi)
 
+ E
 
 
i
 
τ − D   ∂xi
∂γi
∂γi
∂τ
(1 − γi)
 
−E
   
τE(xi) − D xi
  ∂γi
∂τ
 
(17)
An alternative formulation is
dE(ψ)
dτ
= E
 
 
i
 
τ − D   dxi
dτ
(1 − γi)
 
− E
   
τE(xi) − D xi
  ∂γi
∂τ
 
where dxi/dτ = ∂xi/∂τ + (∂xi/∂γi)(∂γi/∂τ).
Making use of standard statistical concepts, we can reformulate terms as follows
  
τ − E(D )
 
E
 
dxi
dτ
 
(1 − γi) −
 
cov
 
D ,
dxi
dτ
 
(1 − γi)
−
   
τE(xi) − E(D )E(xi) − cov(D ,xi
   ∂γi
∂τ
In the absence of uncertainty, the pollution tax would be set equal to the marginal external
damage. The question is whether, in the presence of uncertainty, we would wish to set the
pollution tax equal to the expected marginal external damage: τ = E(D ).I ft h em a r g i n a l
damage, D , is constant across states, we would indeed wish to do so. In this case the cost
function would be linear rather than convex. However, where the marginal damage varies
across states, the outcome will be improved by setting the tax so that it provides a greater
marginal incentive in the states where the marginal damage is greatest.
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To consider what this implies, we take the tax set at the rate of expected marginal external
damage as a point of departure. We get
∂E (ψ)
∂τ
=
   
cov(D ,xi
  ∂γi
∂τ
 
−
 
cov
 
D ,
dxi
dτ
 
(1 − γi) (18)
Where output is larger, the marginal external cost is larger and the ﬁrst covariance in this
expression is positive. Under the assumption that the tax stimulates investment in abatement
technology,theﬁrstmaintermisthenpositive.Theintuitionforthissignisthatinvestmentin
abatement technology will have a larger impact the larger is the scale of polluting production
and accordingly the marginal external cost.
In general we cannot tell how the tax effect on output varies across states. We note that
where the marginal output response to the tax (dxi/dτ) is non-increasing in output level, i.e.
the polluting output is reduced more (or increased less) when the marginal external cost is
larger, cov
 
D ,dxi/dτ
 
≤ 0. This would obviously be true both in a linear case and in an
isoelastic case, and appears to be a plausible assumption. Then both terms in (18) would be
non-negative.
We can draw the following conclusion.
Proposition 1 Cov
 
D ,dxi/dτ
 
≤ 0 is a sufﬁcient but not a necessary condition for the
Pigouviantaxtobeoptimally set abovetheexpectedmarginal externaldamage:τ>E(D ).
This condition will hold in the special case S1.
Setting the tax equal to the expected marginal damage does not allow for the fact that due
totheconvexityofthedamagefunctionthebeneﬁtfromdiminishingtheexternalcostislarger
in states where emissions are larger. Inducing further investment in abatement technology
will have the effect of directing more of the emission reductions to those states since a better
abatement technology will have a larger impact where it affects a larger number of units of
output. This effect is reﬂected by the ﬁrst of the terms in (18). If in addition the impact of
the tax directly on output is larger in those states (the second covariance in (18) is negative)
therewill beabeneﬁtfromincreasingthetaxbeyondtheaverageeffect equalto theexpected
marginal damage.
Sincethedamagefunctionisstrictlyconvexintotaloutput,theexpectedvalueofthedam-
age reduction from investment in abatement technology will exceed the expected tax savings
of the producer, so there will be underinvestment in abatement from the social perspective.
There is a social gain from further investment, not allowed for by the private investor. To
encourage greater abatement investment—and hence greater emissions reductions in states
where marginal damage is large—the tax must be set above the expected marginal damage.
Thedrawbackisthattherewillthenbeadownwarddistortionofoutputforagivenabatement
technology as the external cost is now being over-internalised.4 For a given investment level,
the output is too small. Where a tax is the only instrument it cannot simultaneously achieve
both the desired output level and the desired investment. The optimum is characterised by a
trade-off between the concerns with output and investment.
In formal terms, this is demonstrated by (17), where the overall effect of the tax is broken
down into the direct effect on output and the effects of the induced change in abatement
technology, where the latter in turn consists of the effect via output and the abatement effect
on emissions for a given output. Where τ>E(D ), as highlighted in Proposition 1, the ﬁrst
main term in (17) is negative reﬂecting excessive output reduction. Where (17) is equated to
4 Thetax-inclusivecostfacingtheproducerswilloverstatethesocialcostofproduction(includingtheexternal
cost).
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zero at the pure tax optimum, this negative effect must be offset by a positive marginal effect
of abatement investment at the optimum, as captured by the remaining terms. In this sense
there will be a combination of “underproduction” and “underinvestment” at the optimum,
and alleviating one of the distortions can only be achieved by aggravating the other. In other
words, partial increases in output and investment, would both be socially desirable but not
achievable by a tax alone. In the next section we will discuss opportunities for realising these
gains by using the tax and direct regulation of technology as separate instruments.
5 The Government Sets τ and γ
Where cost functions are identical across ﬁrms, producers will obviously choose the same
value of γi. This is of course an extremely strict assumption, and in general γi will vary
across ﬁrms. However, where the special functional forms S1 apply, and there is no payment
up front, a sufﬁcient condition for a uniform value of γi is simply that the cost function
ki(γi) is the same for all ﬁrms. This may be a reasonable assumption where a new abatement
technology becomes available and is widely adopted.
Consider the case with uniform γ where the government can set τ and γ. Maximisation
of the expected social surplus then implies the ﬁrst order conditions
∂E (ψ)
∂τ
=
   
 
i
 
p − C 
i (xi) −
∂Gi
∂xi
 
− D   
i
(1 − γ)
 
∂xi
∂τ
f (p)dp
= E
 
 
i
 
τ − D   ∂xi
∂τ
(1 − γ)
 
=
 
i
 
 
τ − E(D )
 
E
 
∂xi
∂τ
 
(1 − γ) − (1 − γ)cov
 
D ,
∂xi
∂τ
  
= 0 (19)
where (4) has been invoked.
∂E (ψ)
∂γ
=
   
 
i
 
p − C 
i (xi) −
∂Gi
∂xi
 
− D   
i
(1 − γ)
 
∂xi
∂γi
f (p)dp
−
   
 
i
 
∂Gi
∂γ
+ K 
i − D xi
  
f (p)dp
which is equivalent to
∂E (ψ)
∂γ
=
 
i
  
τ − E(D )
 
E
 
∂xi
∂γ
 
(1 − γ) − (1 − γ)cov
 
D ,
∂xi
∂γ
  
−
 
i
 
E
 
∂Gi
∂γ
 
+ E
 
K 
i
 
− E(D )E(xi) − cov
 
D ,xi
 
 
= 0( 2 0 )
Assuming ∂xi
∂τ is constant across states, and accordingly cov
 
D , ∂xi
∂τ
 
= 0, as in our
special case S1, we get from (19)t h a tτ = E(D ). Also assuming that ∂xi/∂γi is invariant
across states, we can then write:
12328 V. Christiansen, S. Smith
∂E (ψ)
∂γ
=
 
i
 
E(D )E(xi) + cov
 
D ,xi
 
− E
 
∂Gi
∂γ
 
− E
 
K 
i
 
 
= 0 (21)
Thebeneﬁtfromincreasingγ consistsofanexpectedreductioninexternalcostandagain
from directing the reductions towards cases where they are more highly valued (as captured
by the covariance). This beneﬁt must be traded off against the cost of adopting and running
a more advanced abatement technology.
As E (∂Gi/∂γ) + E
 
K 
i
 
is increasing in γ, we can see that γwill be larger where the
expected marginal damage is larger, and where the marginal damage varies more strongly
across states with different output levels.
We can summarise our ﬁndings as follows
Proposition 2 Wherethegovernmentcandetermineboththeemissiontaxandtheabatement
technology,andthetaxeffectonoutputisuniformacrossstates,thetaxisoptimallysetequal
to the expected marginal damage.
Where the effect of abatement technology on output is constant across states, the optimal
abatement technology is characterised by the beneﬁt-cost trade-off
 
i
 
E(D )E(xi) + cov
 
D ,xi
 
− E
 
∂Gi
∂γ
 
− E
 
K 
i
 
 
= 0.
γ will be larger where the expected marginal damage is larger, and where the marginal
damage varies more strongly across states with different output levels.
To shed further light on the effects, we consider the following special case, S2:
Special case S2 There is no payment up front, K 
i = 0. The cost structure is the same
in all ﬁrms and given by the special functions S1 considered above: C(x) = cx2/2a n d
G(x,γ)= k(γ)x. We also assume that the damage (external cost) function has the form
D(Z) = D
  
i (1 − γi)xi
 
= 1
2eZ2 = 1
2e
  
i (1 − γi)xi
 2 where e is a positive
parameter, and Z denotes aggregate emissions.
In these circumstances,
τ = E
⎛
⎝e
 
j
(1 − γ)x j
⎞
⎠
as we know from above that τ = E
 
D  
,a n d( 20) is equivalent to
∂E( )
∂γ
= e(1 − γ)var(X) +
 
e(1 − γ)E(X) − k (γ)
 
E(X) = 0
It follows that
k (γ)
1 − γ
= e(E(x) + varX/E (X))
The left hand side is increasing in γ. It follows that γ is larger the larger is the damage
parameter e,a n dγ is larger the larger is the variance of X for a given expected value. The
latter ﬁnding is easy to understand since the beneﬁcial property of the investment is that its
impact is stronger where output and (marginal) damage are larger, and this is accentuated
when the output level does indeed vary a lot across states.
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Proposition 3 In case S2 where the government sets the emission tax, τ, and regulates
the abatement technology γ, the optimal use of the instruments is characterised by τ =
E
 
e
 
j (1 − γ)x j
 
and k (γ) = e(1 − γ)E
 
(X)2 
/E (X). The tax is set equal to the
expected marginal damage, and the investment in abatement technology is set to reﬂect the
output (and damage) variance across states.
In the discussion above we have been considering the case where it makes sense to set a
uniform abatement technology γ. Where, however, there is heterogeneity among ﬁrms, there
will be a case for variation in abatement technology. A uniform standard will then involve
inefﬁciencies, but might still outperform a regime based on tax alone. However, optimally-
differentiated direct regulation of the abatement technology of each individual ﬁrm to reﬂect
ﬁrm-level heterogeneity is likely to be difﬁcult to implement. For this case, therefore, we
turn our attention to the use of subsidies to stimulate investment in abatement technology.
6 Subsidising Investment in Abatement Technology
In the discussion above we have shown that relying solely on an emissions tax to achieve
abatementwillrequirethetaxtobesetabovethelevelofexpectedmarginaldamage,andthat
abetteroutcome,withinvestmentinmore-effectiveabatementtechnology,couldbeachieved
bysupplementingtheemissionstaxwithasecondinstrument,intheformofdirectregulation
ofabatementtechnology.Inthissection,weconsideranalternative,market-based,approach,
in which the second instrument takes the form of a subsidy to abatement investment. Such
subsidy schemes exist or are often proposed either as explicit subsidies or in the form of a
tax rebate to reward abatement.5
Weconsidertwokindsofsubsidytoacquisitionofabatementtechnology.Theﬁrst,which
we denote S, is an “abatement cost” subsidy, taking the form of a payment in proportion to
any ﬁxed cost of investing in abatement technology, SKi (γi). The second, which we denote
s, is an “output-scaled” abatement subsidy, sγixi. We may note that since γi is a measure
of abatement per unit of output γixi is a measure of ﬁrm i’s volume of abatement when its
output is xi. In other words, the output-scaled subsidy is paid in proportion to the emission
reduction achieved by the technology at the subsequent output level.
We begin by returning to (17) above, which we can formulate as
dE(ψ)
dτ
=
 
i
(1 − γi)
 
 
τ − E(D )
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∂xi
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− cov
 
D ,
∂xi
∂τ
  
+
 
i
(1 − γ)
∂γ
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τ − E(D )
 
E
 
∂xi
∂γi
 
−
 
i
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D ,
∂xi
∂γi
  
− E
   
τE(xi) − D xi
  ∂γi
∂τ
 
= 0 (17)
In order to limit the number of possible cases to address, we shall conﬁne our attention to
the case where the ﬁrst line of (17’) is negative, as it will be in the special case S1 considered
above.
E
 
τ − D   ∂xi
∂τ
< 0( 2 2 )
5 Rajah and Smith (1993).
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and
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∂γi
∂τ
 
 
τ − E(D )
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D ,
∂xi
∂γi
  
−
   
τE(xi) − D xi
  ∂γi
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> 0 (23)
In the subsidy regime, proﬁts are given by
 i = pxi − Ci (xi) − τ (1 − γi)xi − (1 − S) Ki (γi) − Gi (γi,xi) + sγixi (24)
The ﬁrst and second order conditions for the producer’s optimal choice of xi and γi,
respectively, are
∂ i/∂xi = p − C 
i (xi) − (1 − γi)τ − ∂Gi (γi,xi)/∂xi + sγi = 0,
∂2 i/∂x2
i < 0 (25)
and
∂E ( i)
∂γi
= τE (xi) − (1 − S) K 
i (γi) − E
 
∂Gi
∂γi
 
+ sE(xi) = 0,
∂2E ( i)
∂γ2
i
< 0 (26)
Comparative statics yield
∂xi/∂τ = (1 − γi)/
 
∂2 i/∂x2
i
 
< 0 (27)
∂xi/∂s =− γi/
 
∂2 i/∂x2
i
 
> 0 (28)
We see that
∂xi/∂s =−
γi
1 − γi
∂xi/∂τ (29)
It is obvious from (26)t h a t
∂γi
∂s
=
∂γi
∂τ
∂γi
∂S
=− K 
i/
∂2E ( i)
∂γ2
i
> 0( 3 0 )
We consider ﬁrst the case of the abatement cost subsidy S.W ec a ns e et h a tS will have
no direct impact on ﬁrms’ output levels, i.e. xi will remain unchanged for ﬁxed γi.H o w e v e r ,
the induced change in γi will affect xi.
Starting from the case where there is no subsidy, we consider the effect of adding a small
subsidy. Allowing S to deviate slightly from zero gives the following effect on the expected
surplus:
∂E ( )
∂S
=
 
i
∂E ( )
∂γi
∂γi
∂S
= E
 
 
i
 
τ − D   ∂xi
∂γi
(1 − γi)
 
∂γi
∂S
−E
   
τE(xi) − D xi
   ∂γi
∂S
> 0 (31)
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where the sign is due to assumption (23) above. This is an unsurprising result in view of our
discussion above. The effect of S is to induce beneﬁcial investment in abatement technology
without directly affecting output.
Wenowconsidertheoutput-scaledabatementsubsidys.Thistakestheformofapayment,
per unit of abatement, based on the emissions reduction achieved by the chosen abatement
technology, given the ﬁrm’s actual level of output. The subsidy payment provides encour-
agement to abatement investment, but at the same time provides an incentive for subsequent
output. A change in s will affect xi both directly via the cost of production and indirectly via
the induced change in γi. If we again take as point of departure the no-subsidy case, s = 0,
comparative statics yields the following:
∂γi
∂s
=
 
E (xi) + τE
 
∂xi
∂s
 
− E
 
∂2Gi
∂xi∂γi
∂xi
∂s
    
−
∂2E ( i)
∂γ2
i
 
In general, the marginal increase in subsidy has opposing effects. A larger s will lower
the private cost of investment and make it more proﬁtable. It will also lower the cost of
production and enhance output, which in turn makes it more proﬁtable to invest in abatement
technology. However, a larger output will enhance the operating cost of better technology
and make the technology more costly. We assume that the last effect will not outweigh the
other more direct effects.
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Departing from the pure tax optimum, the question is what can be obtained by means
of the subsidy beyond what is already achieved by the tax. This is easily demonstrated by
making use of the initial optimality condition ∂E(ψ)/∂τ = 0, allowing us to write:
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where the sign is due to (22).
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Thesubsidys,unlike S,willdirectlyaffectoutputinadditiontoinvestment.Indeed,itwill
stimulate output, which is a beneﬁcial effect as initially the tax depresses output below the
desirable level as a side effect of using the tax to induce investment. The effect on investment
is no different from the effect of the tax on investment. The difference is that in contrast to
the tax the subsidy will stimulate output and therefore it is that output effect that appears in
(32).
Proposition 4 Where an optimal emission tax is used in the absence of regulation of abate-
ment technology the social surplus can be enhanced by introducing one of two forms of
subsidy to investment in abatement technology, a percentage subsidy to investment expendi-
ture on abatement technology, S, or an output-scaled subsidy s. Both stimulate investment
in abatement technology, while avoiding the excessive incentive for output reduction which
arises when using the emissions tax as the sole instrument. In particular, the output-scaled
abatement subsidy s acts to stimulate output as well as investment, while the abatement
investment subsidy S only acts through its impact on investment.
To compare a subsidy and direct regulation, now consider the s subsidy with our special
cost functions S1, assuming no up-front payment and uniform ki = k, which is the case
in which imposing a uniform abatement standard would be most appropriate. Given our
assumed subsidy scheme the proﬁts of each producer i are
 i = pxi −
1
2
cx2
i − τ(1 − γi)xi − k(γi)xi + sγixi
As before, the producer is assumed to maximise proﬁts after the price uncertainty has
been resolved. Maximising proﬁts with respect to output yields
xi =
p − τ(1 − γi) − k(γi) + sγi
ci
(33)
γi is chosen to maximise expected proﬁts, which requires that
k (γi) = τ + s, (34)
implying that γi = γ = k −1(τ + s).
Moreover it follows that
∂xi
∂τ
=−
1 − γ
ci
(35)
∂xi
∂s
=
γ
ci
=−
γ
1 − γ
∂xi
∂τ
(36)
∂γ
∂τ
=
∂γ
∂s
=
1
k  (γ)
, (37)
which conﬁrms that τ and s have the same effect on the choice of abatement scale γ.T h e
fact that subsidising abatement technology provides a stimulus to choosing larger abatement
scale that is no different from that of an emission tax may throw doubt on the gains from
adding this instrument. Moreover a tax discourages polluting production while a subsidy
makes production cheaper and increases output, which is the well-known disadvantage of
subsidising abatement rather than taxing emissions. However, as we realised above, the
combined use of the two instruments can yield additional beneﬁts.
It is possible to show that using the proper combination of the emissions tax and subsidy
instruments can in fact reproduce the allocation achieved by means of direct regulation and
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a tax. Denote this allocation by γ∗ and xi∗ (for all i) and denote by τ∗ the optimal tax
used in conjunction with direct regulation. We use the notation ˜ τ and ˜ s for the tax and the
subsidy when that combination is being used. From (34) we see that to obtain γ∗ one has to
set ˜ τ +˜ s = k (γ∗). Combining the supply functions for the two cases from (10)a n d( 33)w e
have that in order to obtain xi∗ we must have
xi∗=
p − τ∗(1 − γ∗) − k(γ∗)
ci
=
p −˜ τ(1 − γ∗) − k(γ∗) +˜ sγ∗
ci
,
which requires that ˜ τ(1−γ∗)−˜ sγ∗=τ∗(1−γ∗). Adding this to ˜ τ +˜ s = k (γ∗) then gives
us two equations to determine the instruments needed to implement the same allocation as
the one achieved with a tax and direct regulation. We note that ˜ τ = τ∗+˜ sγ∗/(1 − γ∗).T h e
interesting implication is that when deploying a subsidy rather than direct regulation the tax
will be set at a higher rate.
Proposition 5 InthespecialcaseS1andassumingnoup-frontpaymentanduniformki = k,
the same second best optimum can be achieved by using either a combination of an emission
tax and direct regulation of abatement technology, or alternatively a higher emission tax
combined with an “output-scaled” subsidy to investment in abatement technology.
7 Conclusions
It is well known that uncertainty about the costs of emissions abatement can establish a
case for combined use of different regulatory instruments, such as price-based regulation
through an emissions tax and quantity-based regulation through a tradeable emissions quota
(Roberts and Spence 1976). In this paper we have considered a different case for combined
use of multiple instruments under conditions of uncertainty, in which the regulator seeks
to inﬂuence a once-for-all abatement investment decision, while being uncertain about the
costs of further abatement opportunities that arise in the course of subsequent operation. We
suggest that the temporal sequence of decisions that must be taken provides a more natural
framework for characterising abatement cost uncertainties.
The conventional wisdom, based on deterministic cases, is that where an emissions tax
reﬂects the external cost, ﬁrms will choose the appropriate balance between different forms
of abatement—in other words, initial investment in abatement technology and subsequent
abatement through output reductions in the course of operation will both be employed up to
the point where the respective marginal cost of abatement equals the emissions tax rate. In
these cases there is no need for the tax to be supplemented by instruments bearing directly
on abatement investment. We show that the optimal policy may be different when future
abatement costs are uncertain or ﬂuctuate over time, and the tax instrument is insufﬁciently
ﬂexible to be adjusted to all conceivable circumstances.
In the model we have described in this paper, both ﬁrms and the regulator face initial
uncertainty about future output prices, and hence about the cost of abatement through future
output changes. If the emissions tax is employed as the sole instrument and set at the level
of expected marginal external damage, as would be optimal in the absence of uncertainty,
there will normally be ex post inefﬁciencies, since the tax will provide the same incentive
for abatement in states of the world in which emissions are large and damage is high as
it provides in states where damage is lower. Ideally we would like an instrument which
provides particular encouragement to abatement in states of the world where damage is high.
Ifstate-adjustedtaxesarenotavailable,thetaxwillnormallyneedtobesetabovethelevelof
12334 V. Christiansen, S. Smith
expected marginal external damage, to induce further investment in abatement technology,
whichhastheeffectofdirectingmoreoftheemissionsreductionstostatesoftheworldwhere
emissions,andhencemarginaldamagecosts,arehigher.However,thetaxachievesthisatthe
cost of encouraging excessive abatement through output reductions in subsequent operation.
Given the inefﬁciency of regulation through a ﬁxed emissions tax alone, we have con-
sidered whether combined use of multiple instruments can improve the regulatory outcome.
First,wehavedemonstratedthatifitwerepossibletodirectlyregulatetheabatementtechnol-
ogy decisions of ﬁrms, efﬁcient abatement investment could be achieved with less damage to
outputlevelsthanwiththetaxalone.However,efﬁcientdirectregulation,differentiatedtotake
accountofthecostsofindividualﬁrms,islikelytohaveveryhighinformationalrequirements
that would in practice rule this option out. Uniform direct regulation of abatement decisions
might be more feasible in practice, but would involve a trade-off: a better adjustment to ex
post costs, but inefﬁcient distribution of abatement across heterogeneous ﬁrms.
A market-based alternative, better able to reﬂect the costs of individual ﬁrms, would be
to pay subsidies to abatement investment. We have considered two forms of subsidy, one
which pays a percentage of the cost of abatement investment, and the other which pays an
amountbasedontheeffectivenessoftheabatementtechnologyemployedandthesubsequent
output level of the ﬁrm (measured as the emission reduction achieved by the technology at
the subsequent output level). We show that under conditions of uncertainty it will always
be desirable to supplement an emissions tax with a subsidy to abatement, rather than to rely
on the emissions tax alone. If used as the sole instrument the tax would have to be set at a
level which can lead to an excessive subsequent reduction in output, so that the externality is
over-internalised for a given abatement technology. As the tax and the subsidy have the same
effect on investment in abatement technology but differ in their effect on output, the gain
from introducing a subsidy is that it mitigates the excessive output effect without weakening
the incentive to invest in abatement technology. Likewise, using a subsidy on its own would
have the well-known disadvantage that it would encourage polluting emissions by lowering
the cost of production and hence raising output. However, when the two instruments are
deployed together, the output stimulus from the subsidy becomes a virtue, in that it acts to
offset the excessive discouragement of output when the tax is set at the level necessary to
achieve adequate abatement investment.
Finally, we compare the outcome that can be achieved with the combined use of an
emissions tax and subsidy with the second-best optimum based on the emissions tax and
optimally-differentiated regulation. Here we have conﬁned our discussion to the case where
ﬁrms would choose uniform gamma, avoiding the complexity issue. We show that, if the
second form of subsidy is employed, it would be possible to achieve the same second-best
optimum as with the tax and regulation. When combined with the subsidy, the emissions tax
would be set at a higher rate than when combined with direct regulation.
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